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VIEWS AND REVIEWS
Imaginary Dialogue between Heidegger and 
a Buddhist with apologies for possible 
implausibilities of the personalities
Joan Stambaugh
Buddhist'. Professor Heidegger, in the interest of a future dialogue be­
tween East and West, I think it admirable that a Western philosopher 
has finally placed death in the center of the existential situation, un­
mitigated by hopes for Platonic immortality or Christian promises of 
an afterlife. I personally am particularly interested in your emphasis on 
nothingness, a question, of course, not unrelated to the question of 
death. Today I should very much like to pursue what you say about the 
question of nothingness and your related conception of the clearing. 
You yourself have referred to “the inevitable conversation with the 
East Asian world.”1 Perhaps we might begin by discussing your 
dialogue between a Japanese and a questioner on the subject of 
language.21 have just re-read it, and it is still fresh in my mind. In it the 
Japanese referred to emptiness, which for us is the highest name for 
what you perhaps mean by the word “being.” How do you understand 
the term “emptiness?”
1 The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt, New York: Harper 
and Row, 1977, p. 158.
2 In On the Way to Language.
Heidegger: I believe the Japanese called emptiness “kit,” the emp­




Heidegger:, What makes me uneasy is the expression “without 
limits.” When the Greeks spoke of nothingness, they made a sharp 
distinction between me on, relative nothingness, and ouk on, absolute 
nothingness. By absolute nothingness I understand sheer nugatory 
nothingness, which is indicative of the common aversion to anything 
not “positive” and “life-affirming.” This conception of nothingness is 
totally blind to the deeply “affirmative,” “creative” possibilities of 
nothingness that are expressed in me on, relative nothingness. This 
nothingness is a definite, unique nothingness and belongs to the heart 
of being.
Buddhist: Your objection to absolute nothingness sounds very much 
like your objection to Rilke’s conception of the Open, which you 
criticized in “What Are Poets For?”.
Heidegger: Precisely. Not only is Rilke’s conception metaphysical, 
but, beyond that, it is curiously close to the Christian idea of the In­
finite. The Open is without all bounds. In the essay you mentioned, I 
stated that Rilke’s Open is precisely what is closed up, uncleared, what 
draws on in boundlessness, so that nothing can be encountered in it. I 
myself often used the term “the Open,” but I gradually came to aban­
don it in favor of the term “clearing.”
Buddhist: What is the difference between the Open and the clearing? 
This seems to me to be an essential question.
Heidegger: You are right. Just think of the image of a clearing in the 
forest. It is a defined, open space in which something can presence and 
be encountered. In contrast, Rilke’s Open is completely indefinite, 
without all bounds, and nothing can presence or be encountered in it. 
Rilke’s Open is uncleared, opaque, so to speak. It is a boundless, mute, 
opaque in-finity in which nothing can presence or happen. Presencing 
must have limits and be defined. The clearing must be structured and at­
tuned (gefiigt und gestimmt).
Buddhist: And yet you yourself consistently say that the Nothing 
belongs to being. You are one of the first Western thinkers to assert 
this, and that is partly what draws many Easterners, Buddhists in par­
ticular, to your thinking.
Heidegger: But by the Nothing I have never meant boundless emp­
tiness.
Buddhist: What do you have against the term “emptiness”? It is an 
absolutely central word for Buddhists.
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Heidegger: There can be no presencing in emptiness. Emptiness 
precludes presencing.
Buddhist: It is astonishing to hear you say that. Let us try to discuss 
this further. Buddhists are now speaking about relative nothingness or 
emptiness and absolute nothingness or emptiness.
Heidegger: That would correspond to the Greek me on and ouk on. 
Ouk on, absolute nothing, means what I call nugatory nothingness, 
nothing at all; I reject this concept which coincides with the common 
understanding of nothing, an “understanding” that exhausts itself in 
simple aversion. Me on, relative nothing, on the other hand, denies 
something to a thing which belongs to it, and is thus related to it: a 
kind of keeping at bay, a rejection, a prevention. But the denial or the 
not remains related to the thing rejecting it and keeping it at bay, thus 
it is through and through a definite lack, denial, nothingness. It is this 
particular lack.
Buddhist: We may mean by relative nothingness pretty much the 
same thing. Wherein we differ is in regard to absolute nothingness. Far 
from regarding absolute nothingness as merely nugatory nothingness 
or even any kind of absence at all, Buddhists experience absolute 
nothingness or emptiness as the only possibility of experiencing totali­
ty, wholeness, fullness.
Heidegger: Could you perhaps elucidate that?
Buddhist: As you yourself know, the experience of someting or any 
particular thing precludes the experience of anything else. When I look 
at a tree, particularly if I objectify it as we all, East and West, tend to 
do, I see only that tree; I do not see, for example, the flowering bush 
next to it.
Heidegger: But what if I am able to see a tree, for example, the way 
Van Gogh painted it? Then I would not objectify it, and the experience 
of the tree would not rigidly exclude other things.
Buddhist: Agreed. But there are not many of us who can see a tree 
the way Van Gogh saw it; the experience is admittedly rare.
Heidegger: Rare, but possible.
Buddhist: But what if there is a way of seeing the world that opens 
up and infinitely expands that possibility?—then it would not be rare.
Heidegger: That sounds intriguing, but in our period of what I call 
the history of being, I tend to doubt that it is possible. In the epoch of 
Framing and technology, it may not be possible to see the world that 
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way. Framing blocks any pristine kind of presencing.
Buddhist: I cannot argue with that. What you are speaking of is 
predominantly an epoch of Western history, and yet it has profoundly 
affected the East as well. What you call Framing or technology has its 
roots in the West, but the growth has spread over the entire globe. 
Nothing can be isolated any longer. Yet you yourself have expressed 
the hope for an “end” to Framing and technology, and also to objecti­
fying, calculative thinking.
Heidegger: That is true. I have expressed the hope for a more primor­
dial belonging together of man and being, experienced as the Fourfold, 
the Fourfold of earth and heaven, the godlike ones and the mortals.
Buddhist: But how is the Fourfold to be experienced! In your 
language, where does it presence?
Heidegger: The Fourfold presences in the thing, whether that thing 
be a jug, a bridge, a tree or whatever.
Buddhist: But how, according to you, can four different “things” 
presence in one thing? With this question I am not digressing; I am get­
ting back to a discussion of emptiness. You will see what I mean.
Heidegger: I think I already have some idea. Initially, I would 
answer that the Fourfold does not consist of “things” in the ordinary 
sense, nor is the thing in which they presence any kind of object, but 
more of a possibility, a possible site for the Fourfold to presence. I 
have tried to describe how earth, heaven, the godlike ones and mortals 
presence in a jug in my essay “The Thing.”
Buddhist: Yes, I know that fine essay. We are agreed in what we re­
ject: the separateness of reified objects. What we yet have to try to 
clarify is how it is possible for a totality. I take it that the Fourfold is a 
kind of totality, to presence in a thing. In that essay you even say that 
what does the vessel’s holding, what holds the wine is the emptiness of 
the jug.
Heidegger: Yes, but by emptiness I did not mean indefinite emp­
tiness, but rather the specific emptiness of that jug.
Buddhist: Thus, in your terminology, a me on, not an ouk on. Bud­
dhists feel that in order to attain true affirmation, the negation must 
itself be negated. In other words, relative nothingness, me on, must be 
negated in order to arrive at absolute nothingness or emptiness.
Heidegger: You mean to arrive at some kind of Hegelian synthesis. 
Buddhist: No. By negating the negation you arrive at, so to speak, 
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another dimension of the same reality you started with. There is no 
“position” (thesis) or positing whatever involved. There is no progres­
sion (from thesis to antithesis to syntheses); it is a matter of penetrating 
to the very reality of the thing in question, be it a jug, a tree or a peb­
ble.
Heidegger; You mean the being of the thing?
Buddhist; I suppose you might want to put it that way. But you must 
remember that Buddhists and also Taoists begin, not with being, but 
with non being, with nothing. What matters is nothing, not being. But 
you may not wish to go that far.
Heidegger; I would want to somehow get beyond the opposition of 
being and nothingness.
Buddhist; Bravo! There we agree completely. But consider this. If 
you negate relative nothingness, me on, the negation yields the specific 
thing negated. If you negate non-tree, you wind up with tree again. 
You end up with the reality of this definite thing. But if you negate ab­
solute nothingness, ouk on, the negation of the lack of everything 
yields everything, absolute reality and fullness.
Heidegger; It sounds good, but I would have to have some ex­
perience of that.
Buddhist; Absolutely. Without the experience of absolute 
nothingness or emptiness all you have are meaningless words. You 
become one of Dogen’s “word-counting scholars.”
Heidegger; But at best absolute nothingness sounds like it might be 
some kind of universal. Absolute nothingness as the universal then sub­
sumes, swallows up, as it were, all the particulars. What I mean by be­
ing is absolutely singular and unique.
Buddhist; In Buddhism emptiness goes together with tathata, 
suchness. Suchness or all the suchnesses are not subsumed under emp­
tiness nor are they swallowed up by it. Particular things absolutely re­
main as they are (as-it-isness, suchness), yet they are paradoxically 
“identical” with emptiness.
Heidegger; To me, suchness or as-it-isness sounds a bit like Meister 
Eckhart’s Istigkeit, isness. If the two are related or indeed are “the 
same,” then I have an inkling of what you are talking about.
Buddhist; The Heart Sutra has the well-known, recurring phrase: 
Form is emptiness; emptiness is form. This is a highly paradoxical 
identity. It is not an identity of mediation of the kind you find in Ger­
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man Idealism, but an immediate identity. Nevertheless, it is not an “in­
itial” identity; no one starts out with it; this identity has to be realized, 
yet the realization, when it occurs, is immediate.
Heidegger'. If you have negation, you have mediation.
Buddhist'. You have perhaps heard the saying: Before enlightenment 
mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers. During enlightenment 
mountains are not mountains and rivers are not rivers. After enlighten­
ment mountains are really mountains and rivers are really rivers. This 
does not describe a process’, you have not gone anywhere. You are re­
ally where you were in the first place.
Heidegger. I believe I can follow that. But why is it not mediation?
Buddhist’. Because in this case you have not negated anything. All 
that happens is that a certain habitual, constrained way of seeing drops 
away; it is shattered. But let us return to the question of negation and 
emptiness. That, after all, is our main topic.
Heidegger: Yes. We must not get off the track.
Buddhist: Let us go back to Rilke’s Open. You said that in it nothing 
could presence or be encountered. I assume that by “be encountered” 
you do not mean a subject encountering an object.
Heidegger: No, no. In boundlessness or the Open, things, if we can 
even speak of things in this case, would simply drift about endlessly. 
There would be nothing to halt them or bring them to a stand. I cannot 
encounter something that drifts endlessly. I cannot catch up with it, so 
to speak. It never achieves a presence. This has nothing to do with sub­
ject or object.
Buddhist: I follow that. But if the thing were brought to a stand by 
some kind of limit or barrier, then it would stand opposite, over 
against me as an ob-ject. As far as I understand the term “object,” an 
object does not presence; it stands opposite, over against me.
Heidegger: I am not talking about an object. For me, the thing is, so 
to speak, the meeting place for the dimensions of earth, heaven, the 
godlike ones and the mortals. There is nothing objective about that.
Buddhist: When a Buddhist sees, truly sees, a thing, he does not en­
counter the thing; he becomes the thing.
Heidegger: You would have to explain that.
Buddhist: It cannot be explained; it can only be seen. But let us 
return to your mention of Van Gogh. If we take a Chinese landscape 
painting, what do we see? Not several or many things as in most 
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Western art, say, a landscape, portrait or still life, but a vast expanse of 
emptiness and somewhere, perhaps in a corner, a twig or a leaf.
Heidegger. I have seen such paintings. They are very fine.
Buddhist'. You respond to a painting of emptiness; it is the concept 
that somehow repels you.
Heidegger: I must admit that for me boundlessness and any kind of 
presence or being absolutely preclude each other. What about the twig?
Buddhist: The twig could be suchness. The twig, the suchness, lets 
you see boundless emptiness; boundless emptiness lets you see the twig.
Heidegger: So there is a presence within emptiness?
Buddhist: Not quite. To go back to the Heart Sutra, form is emp­
tiness, emptiness is form. It is not the case that one sees form within 
emptiness or emptiness within form. You yourself have polemicized in 
Being and Time against this kind of “within.”
Heidegger: Yes, yes. I am beginning to see what you mean. I guess it 
is the immediate identity that gives me trouble. Could you say that emp­
tiness is immanent within the form?
Buddhist: That is just another “within,” an “in which.” Emptiness 
is form.
Heidegger: You are right. I think we are beginning to realize that the 
traditional central concepts of immanence and transcendence are no 
longer adequate to capture the relation of God and world or, in my 
language, of being and beings. I myself would no longer state, as I did 
in Being and Time, that being is the absolute transcendens. Being is 
neither transcendent nor is it absolute. All of that belongs to 
metaphysics and ontotheology.
Buddhist: Now we are beginning to get somewhere. Then why does 
immediate identity cause you so much trouble?
Heidegger: Once one has studied Hegel and his critique of Schelling 
and intuition, it is difficult to be content with immediacy. Above all, 
Hegel believed in “the hard labor of the concept,” in short, in the 
transformation of nature or immediacy by Spirit. Immediacy, as it is, 
is nothing; it only attains significance by being negated and transform­
ed.
Buddhist: At least we agree about the necessity of negation.
Heidegger: But I don’t think we are negating the same thing. Hegel is 
negating immediacy. You are not.
Buddhist: Hegel believes he is negating immediacy.
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Heidegger-. Immediacy is what we start out with. What is so mean­
ingful about that? Surely meaning enters in with Spirit.
Buddhist-. Immediacy is precisely not what we start out with. For ex­
ample, when we first see a tree, we normally think: this is a tree, not a 
bush. It is a birch tree, not an oak tree. In other words, we classify and 
categorize the tree. This is not immediate experience.
Heidegger. Then what would immediate experience be?
Buddhist-. First, I have to negate my habitual categorizing and con­
ceptualizing. Then I have no tree, no thing, relative nothingness, not 
this tree. Finally, I must negate this negation to arrive at absolute no­
thingness.
Heidegger. What is it you then seel
Buddhist'. Suchness.
Heidegger. Hegel, of course, could not accept that. What is real for 
him is the concept, not immediacy. But I think I see what you are get­
ting at.
Buddhist-. Of course we must not cling to words like suchness and ab­
solute nothingness. They remain fingers pointing at the moon. Words 
and concepts point to something; as long as we realize that words are 
not themselves It, they can be helpful. Even, no, especially emptiness 
has to empty itself out. Emptiness itself is empty, nonsubstantial.
Heidegger. I completely agree with that. Not with everything you 
say, but with nonsubstantiality.
Buddhist-. Now, can we fit nonsubstantiality together with what you 
mean by Being? Surely for you being is not substance.
Heidegger. Not at all! That is why instead of the term “being,” 
which is heavily burdened with scholastic and ontotheological connota­
tions, I have come to prefer more “poetic” terms such as Appropria­
tion, the Fourfold and Clearing of self-concealing.
Buddhist-. The last term, Clearing of self-concealing, baffles me. 
Why concealing?
Heidegger-. Being does not unconceal itself completely. We do not 
have clearing alone; we have clearing of self-concealing.
Buddhist-. I am aware that you say that we haven’t had pure clearing, 
that being withdraws and abandons us in the course of the history of be­
ing, and that now even this abandonment has been forgotten. But does 




Heidegger: Concealing is essential. It is true that in the course of the 
history of being concealing has approached distortion, but concealing 
belongs to being. In fact, you could almost abbreviate and say: being is 
self-concealing. If self-concealing is cleared, then we have an ap­
propriate “relation” to being.
Buddhist: But why is concealing so essential?
Heidegger: There is no answer to that; no “why.” It just is.
Buddhist: I beg your pardon. I was not asking for a reason why, a 
logos. I merely fail to understand why concealing is essential. I do 
understand “clearing.” It is a beautiful word. It lets me see transparen­
cy, openness.
Heidegger: We may have reached an impasse here. I cannot explain. 
You would have to see it.
Buddhist: I know just what you are saying. But I cannot see conceal­
ing. At the end of your lecture “The End of Philosophy and the Task 
of Thinking” you ask the question whether the name for the task of 
thinking reads clearing or opening and presence instead of being and 
time. There it is clearing that names being. Where is concealing?
Heidegger: I admit it is absent in that particular formulation. But it 
still belongs to being. I suppose self-concealing has to do with what I 
call the Mystery. Being is never completely unconcealed; it remains 
Mystery.
Buddhist: I like mystery better than self-concealing. I read 
somewhere that mystery comes from muein, to close the mouth. Ac­
cording to that, mystery simply means something that cannot be con­
ceptually expressed; self-concealing, on the other hand, seems to in­
dicate a kind of “deliberate willfulness” in being, almost a niggardly 
refusal to unconceal itself.
Heidegger: I never intended that with self-concealing. Let us try to 
get back to seeing, nonobjectifying seeing or even what you spoke of as 
absolute nothingness, as the possibility of experiencing totality, 
wholeness, fullness.
Buddhist: Yes. That is perhaps more fruitful for us at this point.
Heidegger: I have discussed the experience of nothingness in Being 
and Time as the experience of anxiety and in a lecture course on Basic 
Concepts of Metaphysics, as the experience of boredom. Both ex­
periences are completely objectless. In anxiety things or objects slip 
away and cease to be of any concern or interest to us. The same thing 
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happens in boredom, but more gradually and imperceptibly with a 
different feeling-tone from that of anxiety. In fact, I got so fascinated 
by the phenomenon of boredom that I went on about it for weeks in 
the lecture course. I heard that one of my colleagues remarked that the 
discussion of boredom (Langeweile, a long while) went on for such a 
long while that it demonstrated phenomenologically what it was talk­
ing about!
Buddhist'. Why not? We could bore people right out of objectifying, 
reifying and substantializing!
Heidegger. What I was talking about with both of these phenomena 
is mood. Mood affects and attunes the way in which we see things. It 
seems to me that Western philosophy has ignored the importance and 
influence of mood. Its emphasis has all been on rationality and reason. 
By “mood” I do not just mean feelings and emotions, although they 
are in some way derivative of mood. Mood comes from mode, way.
Buddhist'. Way? Oh!
Heidegger. These two moods, anxiety and boredom, let us experi­
ence the world in a different way. They are absolutely non-objectifying.
Buddhist'. That is a step in the right direction. But do they allow us 
to experience totality?
Heidegger: In a way, yes. I have always spoken of beings as a whole 
(das Seiende im Ganzen). This “as a whole” overcomes us in the ex­
perience of anxiety, boredom or joy.
Buddhist: I do not recall that you ever elaborated upon the ex­
perience of joy. An experience of great, indescribable joy usually ac­
companies the experience of totality. It seems difficult to reconcile joy 
with anxiety or boredom.
Heidegger. What they have in common is the fact they are objectless.
Buddhist: But objectlessness is not sufficient. The experience of 
release accompanied by great joy is lacking in the experiences of anxie­
ty and boredom.
Heidegger: Release? If in anxiety and boredom things are of no con­
cern to you, are you not released from them?
Buddhist: Yes, released from them. Now, released where tol 
Heidegger: Well, I suppose to no-thingness.
Buddhist: Relative no-thingness or absolute no-thingness?
Heidegger: I don’t think one can say to relative no-thingness. 
Buddhist: Thus, released to absolute no-thingness.
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Heidegger-. I’m afraid in this case I’ll have to concede that. There is 
nothing specific or definite about the negation taking place in anxiety 
and boredom.
Buddhist-. Now I should like to ask something about the Fourfold.
Heidegger: Fine. And since our time is getting short, I also have one 
more question for you.
Buddhist: I shall try to keep my question short. It concerns mirror­
ing, the mirror-play of the Fourfold. I know that one of your major 
concerns is to step back out of metaphysics. Surely the Fourfold ac­
complishes this. It is truly not metaphysical.
Heidegger: That is true. It is also the reason why it is not readily ac­
cessible to everybody, particularly not to the philosophers. A poet 
would probably understand it immediately.
Buddhist: In the essay “The Thing” you stated that mirroring does 
not portray a likeness. How, then, is mirroring to be thought?
Heidegger: Each of the four dimensions of the Fourfold mirrors in 
its own way the presencing of others. Mirroring thus clears and frees 
each of the four; none of them insists on its own separate particularity. 
In this manner the four dimensions of the Fourfold interpenetrate each 
other. The best way I have found to describe this is to say they mirror 
each other. It is a dynamic, totally nonsubstantial interrelating.
Buddhist: That is extraordinary. You may not realize how close this 
is to a school of Chinese Buddhism. Close to, not identical with.
Heidegger: I cannot judge that. Now, it is perhaps time to ask my 
final question.
Buddhist: Yes.
Heidegger: I want to know how absolute nothingness can yield totali­
ty. How is an experience of totality possible and how is it that precisely 
absolute nothingness should give it to us?
Buddhist: Let me first say that if there is self-concealing it is not 
possible. Self-concealing and experience of totality are incompatible. 
You will not be able to agree with that, but it has to be said. As for 
totality, if it is to be experienced, it has to presence at one time and one 
place. We cannot experience totality or wholeness cumulatively as a 
sum by traveling over the entire globe or by living one hundred years.
Heidegger: Agreed. Traveling over space and living through time are 
discursive. When I am in Hong Kong, I am not in Tubingen; when I am 
eighty years old, I am no longer forty. No discursive experience of 
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totality is possible. Discursiveness precludes totality. Totality can only 
be experienced simultaneously.
Buddhist'. Good. The experience of totality or wholeness must be all 
at once right now and right here. It is not exclusively in this right now 
and right here, but if I am going to experience it, it has to be in some 
right now and here.
Heidegger. I understand that. I have just been reading Meister 
Eckhart who says something like the following: (I quote approximately 
from memory.) “Many masters thought that the soul is only in the 
heart. That is not so, and great masters have been wrong about this. 
The soul is wholly, and indivisibly totally in the foot and totally in the 
eye and in every member. If I take a piece of time, that is neither today 
nor yesterday. But if I take the now (das Nuri), it embraces all time 
within itself. The now in which God created the world is in this time as 
near as the now in which I am speaking, and the last judgment is as 
near to this now as yesterday.”3
3 Deutsche Predigten und Traktate, Miinchen: Hanser Verlag, 1955, p. 195.
4 Zen Essence, trans. Thomas Cleary, Boston: Shambala, 1989, p. 50.
Buddhist'. That is indeed astonishing! This man experienced totality 
in the absolute eternal now. I should think that the time encompassed 
by the creation of the world and the day of last judgment ought to 
qualify as a totality! I now see that this experience is not absolutely an 
Eastern perogative. Professor Heidegger, we have just touched upon a 
few extremely crucial and highly intriguing topics. For today, let me 
conclude our conversation with the following quote on boundless open­
ness:
“You shouldn’t set up limits in boundless openness, but if you set 
up limitlessness as boundless openness, you’ve trapped yourself. 
This is why those who understand emptiness have no mental image 
of emptiness.
If people use words to label and describe the mind, they still don’t 
comprehend the mind.”4
Heidegger-. Remarkable insight.
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